Organizational complexity and CEO labor markets: Evidence from diversified firms

被引:61
作者
Berry, Tannny K.
Bizjak, John M.
Lemmon, Michael L.
Naveen, Lalitha
机构
[1] Portland State Univ, Dept Finance, Portland, OR 97207 USA
[2] Berry Consultants, College Stn, TX USA
[3] Univ Utah, Dept Finance, Salt Lake City, UT 84112 USA
[4] Georgia State Univ, Dept Finance, Atlanta, GA 30303 USA
关键词
managerial labor market; CEO turnover; diversification; corporate governance;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.04.001
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine whether CEO turnover and succession patterns vary with firm complexity. Specifically, we compare CEO turnover in diversified versus focused firms. We find that CEO turnover in diversified firms is completely insensitive to both accounting and stock-price performance, but CEO turnover in focused firms is sensitive to firm performance. Diversified firms also experience less forced turnover than focused firms. Following turnover, replacement CEOs in diversified firms are older, more educated, and are paid more when hired. Collectively, our results indicate that the labor market for CEOs is different across diversified and focused firms and that firm complexity and scope affect CEO succession. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:797 / 817
页数:21
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