Bank loan loss provisions: a reexamination of capital management, earnings management and signaling effects

被引：366

作者：

Ahmed, AS ^{[1
]}

Takeda, C

Thomas, S

机构：

[1] Syracuse Univ, Sch Management, Dept Accounting, Syracuse, NY 13244 USA

[2] Univ Florida, Warrington Coll Business Adm, Dept Financ Insurance & Real Estate, Gainesville, FL 32611 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 1999年 / 28卷 / 01期

关键词：

discretionary accruals; loan loss provision; regulatory capital; signaling; capital markets;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-4101(99)00017-8

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper exploits the 1990 change in capital adequacy regulations to construct more powerful tests of capital and earnings management effects on bank loan loss provisions. We find strong support for the hypothesis that loan loss provisions are used for capital management. We do not find evidence of earnings management via loan loss provisions. We also document the reasons for the conflicting results on these effects observed in prior studies. Additionally, we find that loan loss provisions are negatively related to both future earnings changes and contemporaneous stock returns contrary to the signaling results documented in prior work. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1 / 25

页数：25