A theoretical foundation of the Porter hypothesis

被引：312

作者：

Ambec, S

Barla, P

机构：

[1] Univ Grenoble, INRA SERD, F-38040 Grenoble 9, France

[2] Univ Salerno, CSEF, I-84100 Salerno, Italy

[3] Univ Laval, Cite Univ, Dept Econ, Laval, PQ G1K 7P4, Canada

[4] Univ Laval, Cite Univ, GREEN, Laval, PQ G1K 7P4, Canada

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2002年 / 75卷 / 03期

关键词：

renegotiation; regulation; R&D; Porter hypothesis;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00005-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This letter shows that, by reducing agency costs, an environmental regulation may enhance pollution-reducing innovation while at the same time increasing firms' private benefit. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：355 / 360

页数：6

共 6 条

[1] CONTRACT RENEGOTIATION - A SIMPLE FRAMEWORK AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ORGANIZATION THEORY
BEAUDRY, P
POITEVIN, M
[J]. CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D ECONOMIQUE, 1995, 28 (02): : 302 - 335
[2] Gore Al., 1992, Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit
[3] TIGHTENING ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS - THE BENEFIT-COST OR THE NO-COST PARADIGM
PALMER, K
OATES, WE
PORTNEY, PR
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 1995, 9 (04) : 119 - 132
[4] TOWARD A NEW CONCEPTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT-COMPETITIVENESS RELATIONSHIP
PORTER, ME
VANDERLINDE, C
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 1995, 9 (04) : 97 - 118
[5] AMERICA GREEN STRATEGY
PORTER, ME
[J]. SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, 1991, 264 (04) : 168 - 168
[6] LIMITED-LIABILITY CONTRACTS BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
SAPPINGTON, D
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1983, 29 (01) : 1 - 21

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