Earnings quality: Evidence from the field

被引:492
作者
Dichev, Ilia D. [1 ]
Graham, John R. [2 ,3 ]
Harvey, Campbell R. [2 ,3 ]
Rajgopal, Shiva [1 ]
机构
[1] Emory Univ, Goizueta Business Sch, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA
[2] Duke Univ, Fuqua Sch Business, Durham, NC 27708 USA
[3] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
Earnings quality; FASB; Earnings management; VALUE-RELEVANCE LITERATURE; REPORTING ENVIRONMENT; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; ACCOUNTING EARNINGS; INFORMATION-CONTENT; POSITIVE RESEARCH; INTERNAL CONTROL; CAPITAL-MARKETS; CASH FLOWS; MANAGEMENT;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.05.004
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We provide insights into earnings quality from a survey of 169 CFOs of public companies and in-depth interviews of 12 CFOs and two standard setters. CFOs believe that (i) above all, high-quality earnings are sustainable and repeatable; specific characteristics include consistent reporting choices, backing by actual cash flows, and absence of one-time items and long-term estimates; (ii) about 50% of earnings quality is driven by non-discretionary factors such as industry and macro-economic conditions; (iii) in any given period, about 20% of firms manage earnings to misrepresent economic performance, and for such firms 10% of EPS is typically managed; (iv) earnings manipulation is hard to unravel from the outside but peer comparisons and lack of correspondence between earnings and cash flows provide helpful red flags. In addition, CFOs disagree with current standard setting on a number of issues including the sheer number of promulgated rules, the top-down approach to rule-making, the neglect of the matching principle, and the emphasis on fair value accounting. They indicate that a rules-based culture makes the audit function centralized and mechanical, and hinders the development of audit professionals. A summary impression from our work is that CFOs view earnings quality as more of a single and unconditional characteristic, in contrast to current research where measures of earnings quality are strongly conditional on the decision setting. This CFO view is related to their idea of "one number" - a single earnings metric that shapes both their interactions with external stakeholders and internal decision-making. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 33
页数:33
相关论文
共 118 条
[61]  
Graham J., 2012, CAPITAL ALLOCATION D CAPITAL ALLOCATION D
[62]  
Graham JR, 2011, J ACCOUNT RES, V49, P137, DOI [10.1111/j.1475-679X.2010.00395.x, 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2010.00S95.x]
[63]   The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the field [J].
Graham, JR ;
Harvey, CR .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2001, 60 (2-3) :187-243
[64]   The economic implications of corporate financial reporting [J].
Graham, JR ;
Harvey, CR ;
Rajgopal, S .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2005, 40 (1-3) :3-73
[65]   A market-based evaluation of discretionary accrual models [J].
Guay, WR ;
Kothari, SP ;
Watts, RL .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 1996, 34 :83-105
[66]  
Healy P. M., 1999, ACCOUNT HORIZ, V13, P365, DOI [10.2308/acch.1999.13.4.365, DOI 10.2308/ACCH.1999.13.4.365]
[67]  
HEALY PM, 1985, J ACCOUNT ECON, V7, P85, DOI 10.1016/0165-4101(85)90029-1
[68]   Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature [J].
Healy, PM ;
Palepu, KG .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2001, 31 (1-3) :405-440
[69]   On the Optimal Relation between the Properties of Managerial and Financial Reporting Systems [J].
Hemmer, Thomas ;
Labro, Eva .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 2008, 46 (05) :1209-1240
[70]   Analyzing Speech to Detect Financial Misreporting [J].
Hobson, Jessen L. ;
Mayew, William J. ;
Venkatachalam, Mohan .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 2012, 50 (02) :349-392