Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers

被引：90

作者：

Laffont, JJ

Robert, J

机构：

[1] UNIV TOULOUSE 1,INST UNIV FRANCE,F-31042 TOULOUSE,FRANCE

[2] UNIV MONTREAL,CTR RECH & DEV ECON,MONTREAL,PQ H3C 3J7,CANADA

[3] CIRANO,MONTREAL,PQ H3A 2AS,CANADA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1996年 / 52卷 / 02期

关键词：

optimal auction; all-pay auction;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(96)00849-X

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We characterize the optimal auction when bidders have (common knowledge) financial constraints. The optimal auction can be implemented by an all-pay auction with the proper reserve price.

引用

页码：181 / 186

页数：6