The crucial role of policy surveillance in international climate policy

被引:38
作者
Aldy, Joseph E. [1 ,2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, John F Kennedy Sch Govt, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Resources Future Inc, Washington, DC 20036 USA
[3] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
International Monetary Fund; World Trade Organization; Climate Policy; Climate Change Policy; International Climate Policy;
D O I
10.1007/s10584-014-1238-5
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
An extensive literature shows that information-creating mechanisms enhance the transparency of and can support participation and compliance in international agreements. This paper draws from game theory, international relations, and legal scholarship to make the case for how transparency through policy surveillance can facilitate more effective international climate change policy architecture. I draw lessons from policy surveillance in multilateral economic, environmental, and national security contexts to inform a critical evaluation of the historic practice of monitoring and reporting under the global climate regime. This assessment focuses on how surveillance produces evidence to inform policy design, enables comparisons of mitigation effort, and illustrates the adequacy of the global effort in climate agreements. I also describe how the institution of policy surveillance can facilitate a variety of climate policy architectures. This evaluation of policy surveillance suggests that transparency is necessary for global climate policy architecture.
引用
收藏
页码:279 / 292
页数:14
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