Technological uncertainty, buyer preferences and supplier assurances: An examination of Pacific Rim purchasing arrangements

We use the metaphor of the mutual assurance game to develop the notion that overseas suppliers may proactively manage uncertainty by making customized investments tp serve their buyers. Using this game-theoretic conceptualization as a complement to the transactions cost analysis notion of credible commitments, we argue that such investments serve as assurances of commitment to the international buyer. The hypotheses are tested using data collected in a survey of U.S. purchasing managers regarding their relationships with their Pacific Rim suppliers. Consistent with our hypotheses, our primary results indicate that suppliers' relationship-specific investments are greater when technological uncertainty is high and buyers value supplier responsiveness. Further, our results suggest that relationship stability and buyer information sharing are greater when supplier relationship-specific investments are greater. These results provide some support for our argument that in the face of technological uncertainty, overseas suppliers may unilaterally commit to their buyers in attempts to obtain reciprocal benefits that help them manage external uncertainty.