Equilibrium investment strategies in foreign environmental projects

被引：16

作者：

Breton, M. ^{[1
]}

Martin-Herran, G.

Zaccour, G.

机构：

[1] HEC Montreal, GERAD, Montreal, PQ, Canada

[2] HEC Montreal, CREF, Montreal, PQ, Canada

[3] Univ Valladolid, Dept Econ Aplicada Matemat, Valladolid, Spain

来源：

JOURNAL OF OPTIMIZATION THEORY AND APPLICATIONS | 2006年 / 130卷 / 01期

基金：

加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;

关键词：

environment; joint implementation; differential games; economics;

D O I：

10.1007/s10957-006-9086-8

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

This paper proposes a two-player, finite-horizon differential game model to analyze joint implementation in environmental projects, one of the flexible mechanisms considered in the Kyoto Protocol. Using a nonlinear specification for the damage costs, we show that, if joint implementation is available, both players will invest in environmental projects in their own location and one of the players will invest abroad, the identity of that player changing at most once during the planning horizon.

引用

页码：23 / 40

页数：18

共 18 条

[1]

BELTRATTI A, 1995, ANN INT SOC DYN GAME, V2, P47

[2] A differential game of joint implementation of environmental projects [J].