Strong belief and forward induction reasoning

被引：161

作者：

Battigalli, P ^{[1
]}

Siniscalchi, M

机构：

[1] Univ Bocconi, Ist Econ Polit, I-20136 Milan, Italy

[2] Princeton Univ, Dept Econ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2002年 / 106卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

conditional belief; strong belief; forward induction; rationalizability; intuitive criterion;

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.2001.2942

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We provide a unified epistemic analysis of some forward-induction solution concepts in games with complete and incomplete information. We suggest that forward induction reasoning may be usefully interpreted as a set of assumptions governing the players' belief revision processes, and define a notion of strong belief to formalize these assumptions. Building on the notion of strong belief, we provide an epistemic characterization of extensive-form rationalizability and the intuitive criterion, as well as sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome in generic games with perfect information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).

引用

页码：356 / 391

页数：36

共 35 条

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