Monitoring by the financial press and forced CEO turnover

被引：84

作者：

Farrell, KA

Whidbee, DA ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Washington State Univ, Coll Business & Econ, Dept Finance Insurance & Real Estate, Pullman, WA 99164 USA

[2] Univ Nebraska, Coll Business, Dept Finance, Lincoln, NE USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE | 2002年 / 26卷 / 12期

关键词：

CEO turnover; corporate governance; earnings announcements;

D O I：

10.1016/S0378-4266(01)00183-2

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper examines Wall Street Journal news stories about 79 firms that forced CEO turnover and a matched sample of firms that did not force CEO turnover. In the two years prior to turnover, firms in the forced-turnover sample were the subjects of 76% more news stories about poor firm performance despite being from the same industry, of similar size, and similar performance as a sample of matched firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that scrutiny of poor firm performance by the financial press increases the likelihood of forced CEO turnover. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：2249 / 2276

页数：28