Operating performance changes associated with corporate mergers and the role of corporate governance

被引：49

作者：

Carline, Nicholas F. ^{[2
]}

Linn, Scott C. ^{[1
]}

Yadav, Pradeep K. ^{[1
,2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Oklahoma, Micahel F Price Coll Business, Norman, OK 73019 USA

[2] Univ Lancaster, Sch Management, Lancaster LA1 4YX, England

[3] Univ Cologne, Ctr Financial Res, D-50923 Cologne, DE, Germany

来源：

JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE | 2009年 / 33卷 / 10期

关键词：

Mergers; Corporate governance; Operating performance; EXECUTIVE STOCK OWNERSHIP; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP; MARKET VALUATION; AGENCY COSTS; FIRM; ACQUISITIONS; RETURNS; SHAREHOLDERS; COMPENSATION; INVESTMENT;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.03.012

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We find that corporate governance characteristics of acquiring firms (board ownership, board size, and block-holder control) have an economically and statistically significant impact on operating performance changes following mergers. We also show that dispersion of intra-board ownership stakes is an important but heretofore overlooked factor when judging the influence of ownership on the outcomes of corporate choices. Finally, we present evidence that suggests the market sometimes under- or overreacts to merger news when initially revaluing merger partners but corrects any miscalculation following the consummation of the merger. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1829 / 1841

页数：13

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