Corporate governance, accounting outcomes, and organizational performance

被引:728
作者
Larcker, David F. [1 ]
Richardson, Scott A.
Tuna, Irem
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] Univ Penn, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
关键词
corporate governance; earnings quality; firm performance; principal component analysis; recursive partitioning;
D O I
10.2308/accr.2007.82.4.963
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The empirical research examining the association between typical measures of corporate governance and various accounting and economic outcomes has not produced a consistent set of results. We believe that these mixed results are partially attributable to the difficulty in generating reliable and valid measures for the complex construct that is termed "corporate governance." Using a sample of 2,106 firms and 39 structural measures of corporate governance (e.g., board characteristics, stock ownership, institutional ownership, activist stock ownership, existence of debtholders, mix of executive compensation, and anti-takeover variables), our exploratory principal component analysis suggests that there are 14 dimensions to corporate governance. We find that these indices have a mixed association with abnormal accruals, little relation to accounting restatements, but some ability to explain future operating performance and future excess stock returns.
引用
收藏
页码:963 / 1008
页数:46
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