Buyers' alliances for bargaining power

被引：42

作者：

Chae, SC ^{[1
]}

Heidhues, P

机构：

[1] Rice Univ, Houston, TX 77005 USA

[2] WZB, D-10785 Berlin, Germany

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY | 2004年 / 13卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1430-9134.2004.00030.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We provide a novel explanation as to why forming an alliance of buyers (or sellers) across separate markets can be advantageous when input prices are determined by bargaining. Our explanation helps to understand the prevalence of buyer cooperatives among small and medium-sized firms.

引用

页码：731 / 754

页数：24

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