Call market book information and efficiency

被引：27

作者：

Arifovic, Jasmina

Ledyard, John

机构：

[1] Simon Fraser Univ, Dept Econ, Burnaby, BC V5A 1S6, Canada

[2] CALTECH, Div Humanities & Social Sci, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL | 2007年 / 31卷 / 06期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

computer testbeds; call markets; learning; experiments with human subjects; closed book; market design;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jedc.2007.01.006

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

What are the consequences of making bids and offers in the book available to traders in a call. market? This is a problem in market design. We employ a computational mechanism design methodology to attack this problem and find that allocative efficiencies are higher in a closed book design. We validate our computational approach by running a series of tests with human subjects in exactly the same environments. (c) 2007 Published by Elsevier B.V.

引用

页码：1971 / 2000

页数：30

共 8 条

[1]

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[2]

Arifovic J., 2004, J PUBLIC ECON THEORY, V6, P205

[3]

CASON T, 1996, MONEY MARKETS METHOD, P1998

[4] HOW TRADING INSTITUTIONS AFFECT FINANCIAL MARKET PERFORMANCE - SOME LABORATORY EVIDENCE [J].