Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems

被引:41
作者
Ehlers, Lars
机构
[1] Univ Montreal, Dept Sci Econ, Montreal, PQ H3C 3J7, Canada
[2] Univ Montreal, CIREQ, Montreal, PQ H3C 3J7, Canada
关键词
matching problem; Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets;
D O I
10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.006
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The following properties of the core of a one-to-one matching problem are well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a distributive lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is the same for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (Von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problems. We show that a set V of matchings is a stable set of a one-to-one matching problem only if V is a maximal set satisfying the following properties: (a) the core is a subset of V, (b) V is a distributive lattice; and (c) the set of unmatched agents is the same for all matchings belonging to V. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b), and (c). (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:537 / 547
页数:11
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