Wild patterns: Ten years after the rise of adversarial machine learning

被引:738
作者
Biggio, Battista [1 ,2 ]
Roli, Fabio [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cagliari, Dept Elect & Elect Engn, Cagliari, Italy
[2] Pluribus One, Cagliari, Italy
基金
欧盟地平线“2020”;
关键词
Adversarial machine learning; Evasion attacks; Poisoning attacks; Adversarial examples; Secure learning; Deep learning; SECURITY; CLASSIFIERS; ROBUSTNESS; ATTACKS; CLASSIFICATION; DEFENSES;
D O I
10.1016/j.patcog.2018.07.023
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
Learning-based pattern classifiers, including deep networks, have shown impressive performance in several application domains, ranging from computer vision to cybersecurity. However, it has also been shown that adversarial input perturbations carefully crafted either at training or at test time can easily subvert their predictions. The vulnerability of machine learning to such wild patterns (also referred to as adversarial examples), along with the design of suitable countermeasures, have been investigated in the research field of adversarial machine learning. In this work, we provide a thorough overview of the evolution of this research area over the last ten years and beyond, starting from pioneering, earlier work on the security of non-deep learning algorithms up to more recent work aimed to understand the security properties of deep learning algorithms, in the context of computer vision and cybersecurity tasks. We report interesting connections between these apparently-different lines of work, highlighting common misconceptions related to the security evaluation of machine-learning algorithms. We review the main threat models and attacks defined to this end, and discuss the main limitations of current work, along with the corresponding future challenges towards the design of more secure learning algorithms. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:317 / 331
页数:15
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