Preschoolers' use of desires to solve theory of mind problems in a pretense context

被引:22
作者
Cassidy, KW [1 ]
机构
[1] Bryn Mawr Coll, Dept Psychol W, Bryn Mawr, PA 19010 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1037/0012-1649.34.3.503
中图分类号
B844 [发展心理学(人类心理学)];
学科分类号
040202 ;
摘要
K. Bartsch and H. M. Wellman (1995) have suggested that 3-year-old children's preference to construe behavior in terms of desire may interfere with their ability to reason according to belief in standard false belief tasks. Other researchers have suggested that young children fail typical measures of theory of mind because they have a reality bias (e.g., P. Mitchell, 1994). Study 1 demonstrates that even young children are able to correctly attribute a false belief to an agent when that belief is about the status of a pretense. Study 2 shows that children find it easier to attribute a false belief when the desires of the agent are eliminated. However, Study 3 suggests that a reality bias also influences children's ability to consider beliefs, implications for recent accounts of theory of mind development are discussed.
引用
收藏
页码:503 / 511
页数:9
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