THE ELUSIVE ANTITRUST STANDARD ON BUNDLING IN EUROPE AND IN THE UNITED STATES IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE MICROSOFT CASES

被引：2

作者：

Economides, Nicholas ^{[1
]}

Lianos, Ioannis ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] NYU, Stern Sch Business, New York, NY 10003 USA

[2] UCL, Fac Laws, London WC1E 6BT, England

来源：

关键词：

ECONOMICS; EXCLUSION; DISCOUNTS; FIRMS; LAW;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

D9 [法律]; DF [法律];

学科分类号：

0301 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：483 / 567

页数：85

共 95 条

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