Strategic gaming analysis for electric power systems: An MPEC approach

被引：568

作者：

Hobbs, BF ^{[1
]}

Metzler, CB

Pang, JS

机构：

[1] Johns Hopkins Univ, Dept Geog & Environm Engn, Baltimore, MD 21218 USA

[2] Johns Hopkins Univ, Dept Math Sci, Baltimore, MD 21218 USA

来源：

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS | 2000年 / 15卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

game theory; operating economics; deregulation; algorithms; market models;

D O I：

10.1109/59.867153

中图分类号：

TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];

学科分类号：

0808 ; 0809 ;

摘要：

Transmission constraints and market concentration may prevent power markets from being fully competitive, allowing firms to exercise market power and raise prices above marginal cost, We present a strategic gaming model for analyzing such markets; it represents an oligopolistic market economy consisting of several dominant firms in an electric power network. Each generating firm submits bids to an ISO, choosing its bids to maximize profits subject to anticipated reactions by rival firms. The single-firm model is formulated as a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) with a parameter-dependent spatial price equilibrium problem as the inner problem. Power flows and pricing strategies are constrained by the ISO's linearized DC optimal power flow (OPF) model. A penalty interior point algorithm is used to compute a local optimal solution of the MPEC, Numerical examples based on a 30 bus network are presented, including multi-firm Nash equilibria in which each player solves an MPEC of the single-firm type.

引用

页码：638 / 645

页数：8