Egalitarian motives in humans

被引:381
作者
Dawes, Christopher T.
Fowler, James H. [1 ]
Johnson, Tim
McElreath, Richard
Smirnov, Oleg
机构
[1] Univ Calif San Diego, Dept Polit Sci, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA
[2] Max Planck Inst Human Dev, Ctr Adapt Behav & Cognit, D-14195 Berlin, Germany
[3] Stanford Univ, Dept Polit Sci, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[4] Univ Calif Davis, Dept Anthropol, Davis, CA 95616 USA
[5] Univ Miami, Dept Polit Sci, Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1038/nature05651
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Participants in laboratory games are often willing to alter others' incomes at a cost to themselves, and this behaviour has the effect of promoting cooperation(1-3). What motivates this action is unclear: punishment and reward aimed at promoting cooperation cannot be distinguished from attempts to produce equality(4). To understand costly taking and costly giving, we create an experimental game that isolates egalitarian motives. The results show that subjects reduce and augment others' incomes, at a personal cost, even when there is no cooperative behaviour to be reinforced. Furthermore, the size and frequency of income alterations are strongly influenced by inequality. Emotions towards top earners become increasingly negative as inequality increases, and those who express these emotions spend more to reduce above-average earners' incomes and to increase below-average earners' incomes. The results suggest that egalitarian motives affect income-altering behaviours, and may therefore be an important factor underlying the evolution of strong reciprocity(5) and, hence, cooperation in humans.
引用
收藏
页码:794 / 796
页数:3
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