Competing payment schemes

被引:60
作者
Guthrie, Graeme
Wright, Julian
机构
[1] Victoria Univ Wellington, Sch Econ, Wellington, New Zealand
[2] Natl Univ Singapore, Fac Arts & Social Sci, Dept Econ, Singapore 117570, Singapore
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-6451.2007.00302.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper presents a model of competing payment schemes. Unlike previous work on generic two-sided markets, the model allows for the fact that in a payment system, users on one side of the market (merchants) compete to attract users on the other side (consumers, who may use cards for purchases). It analyzes how competition between card associations and between merchants affects the choice of interchange fees, and thus the structure of fees charged to cardholders and merchants. Implications for other two-sided markets are discussed.
引用
收藏
页码:37 / 67
页数:31
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