Managerial career concerns, privatization and restructuring in transition economies

被引:29
作者
Roland, G
Sekkat, K
机构
[1] Free Univ Brussels, DULBEA, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium
[2] Free Univ Brussels, Ecare, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium
[3] Ctr Econ Policy Res, London SW1Y 6LA, England
关键词
transition economies; privatization and restructuring; managerial career concerns;
D O I
10.1016/S0014-2921(99)00029-X
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We set up a dynamic adverse selection model to explain how career concerns may induce managers in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to restructure their firms, It is shown how government monopsony power over managers led to the ratchet effect under a socialist economy, even under reforms coming short of privatization. The introduction of a managerial labour market, through privatization, introduces competition for managers and eliminates the ratchet effect, thereby inducing managers to restructure. The model is consistent with the empirical evidence of SOEs restructuring in transition economies. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D29; H39; P29.
引用
收藏
页码:1857 / 1872
页数:16
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