The politician and the judge: Accountability in government

被引:375
作者
Maskin, E
Tirole, J
机构
[1] Inst Adv Study, Princeton, NJ 08540 USA
[2] Princeton Univ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
[3] Inst Econ Ind Manufacture Tabacs, Bur MF529, F-31000 Toulouse, France
[4] GREMAQ, CNRS, UMR 5603, Toulouse, France
[5] CERAS, CNRS, URA 2036, Paris, France
[6] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/0002828042002606
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We build a simple model to capture the major virtues and drawbacks of making public officials accountable (i.e., subjecting them to reelection): On the one hand, accountability allows the public to screen and discipline their officials; on the other, it may induce those officials to pander to public opinion and put too little weight on minority welfare. We study when decision-making powers should be allocated to the public directly (direct democracy), to accountable officials (called "politicians"), or to nonaccountable officials (called "judges").
引用
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页码:1034 / 1054
页数:21
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