Hope or hype: On the viability of escrow services as trusted third parties in online auction environments

被引:101
作者
Hu, XR [1 ]
Lin, ZX
Whinston, AB
Zhang, H
机构
[1] St Louis Univ, John Cook Sch Business, St Louis, MO 63108 USA
[2] Texas Tech Univ, Coll Business Adm, Lubbock, TX 79409 USA
[3] Univ Texas, Red McCombs Sch Business, Austin, TX 78712 USA
[4] Georgia Inst Technol, Coll Management, Atlanta, GA 30332 USA
关键词
escrow service; trusted third party; online auction; fraud; dynamic game; numerical study; optimum pricing;
D O I
10.1287/isre.1040.0027
中图分类号
G25 [图书馆学、图书馆事业]; G35 [情报学、情报工作];
学科分类号
1205 ; 120501 ;
摘要
Internet fraud has been on the rise in online consumer-to-consumer (C2C) auction markets, posing serious challenges to people's trust in electronic markets. Among various remedies to promote trust and reduce trader's risk, online escrow service has been proposed as a trusted third party to protect online transactions from Internet fraud. However, whether an escrow service constitutes a viable business model for a trusted third party to effectively block Internet fraud remains an open question. This research proposes a dynamic game model for online traders and a profit maximization model for the escrow service provider. Through the investigation of the optimal strategies of online traders, we explore the relationships among traders' decision making, escrow service fee rates, and adoption rates. We reveal the demand for escrow services and establish the optimal pricing rule for the escrow service provider. A numerical study based on the theoretical analysis is conducted to provide detailed guidelines of the model application for an escrow service provider and to explore if the escrow service is a viable business model in C2C auction markets.
引用
收藏
页码:236 / 249
页数:14
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