Public regulation as a substitute for trust in quality food markets:: What if the trust substitute cannot be fully trusted?

被引：45

作者：

Anania, G ^{[1
]}

Nisticò, R ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calabria, Dipartimento Econ & Stat, I-87036 Arcavacata Di Rende, Cs, Italy

来源：

JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT | 2004年 / 160卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1628/0932456042776113

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 [经济学];

摘要：

Most food products can be classified as credence goods, and regulations exist to provide consumers with a substitute for the lacking information and trust. Rather than having no regulation in place, producers of high-quality goods are better off when a compromise is reached that leads to an imperfect regulation. Some of the producers of low-quality goods benefit by cheating under a not fully credible regulation. Even producers of low-quality goods who will never label their products as being of high quality may profit from the introduction of an imperfect regulation.

引用

页码：681 / 701

页数：21