A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk

被引:255
作者
Crawford, V [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jeth.1997.2359
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper is a survey of experimental evidence on behavior in ames with communication focusing on environments where "talk is cheap" in the sense that players' messages have no direct payoff implications. Also considered are some environments in which communication was permitted throughout the game, in addition to those environments in which only preplay communication was allowed. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:286 / 298
页数:13
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