Corporate earnings: Facts and fiction

被引:60
作者
Lev, B [1 ]
机构
[1] NYU, New York, NY 10012 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/089533003765888412
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Manipulated earnings played a central role in the slew of corporate scandals which surfaced during the last three years. This article focuses on the vulnerability of earnings to manipulation by managers: it surveys the empirical record of manipulation, their major objectives, and the means of manipulation. It then focuses on the major source of earnings manipulation-the multitude of estimates and subjective judgments underlying the comutation of earnings. The article accordingly concludes with a proposal to curb manipulation by requiring managers to routinely compare key estimates with ex post realizations, and revise earnings in case of large deviations.
引用
收藏
页码:27 / 50
页数:24
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