Intention and stochastic outcomes: An experimental study

被引：74

作者：

Charness, Gary ^{[1
]}

Levine, David I.

机构：

[1] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA

[2] Univ Calif Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA

来源：

ECONOMIC JOURNAL | 2007年 / 117卷 / 522期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02066.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Do people care about intentions - even when good intentions do not produce good results? In our experiments we find that rates of punishment and reward react strongly to intentions (the wage a firm decides to pay) and more modestly to distributional outcomes (the higher or lower wage actually received including the stochastic component). For example, workers who end up receiving medium wages respond much more positively when this resulted from the firm offering a high wage but bad luck lowered the worker's pay than when this resulted from the firm offering a low wage and good luck raised the pay.

引用

页码：1051 / 1072

页数：22

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