Does corporate governance matter in competitive industries?

被引：584

作者：

Giroud, Xavier ^{[1
]}

Mueller, Holger M. ^{[1
,2
,3
,4
]}

机构：

[1] NYU, Stern Sch Business, New York, NY 10012 USA

[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[3] Ctr Econ Policy Res, London EC1V 0DG, England

[4] European Corp Governance Inst, B-1180 Brussels, Belgium

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2010年 / 95卷 / 03期

关键词：

Corporate governance; Product market competition; Anti-takeover legislation; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; STOCK; PERFORMANCE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfineco.2009.10.008

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

By reducing the threat of a hostile takeover, business combination (BC) laws weaken corporate governance and increase the opportunity for managerial slack. Consistent with the notion that competition mitigates managerial slack, we find that while firms in non-competitive industries experience a significant drop in operating performance after the laws' passage, firms in competitive industries experience no significant effect. When we examine which agency problem competition mitigates, we find evidence in support of a "quiet-life" hypothesis. Input costs, wages, and overhead costs all increase after the laws' passage, and only so in non-competitive industries. Similarly, when we conduct event studies around the dates of the first newspaper reports about the BC laws, we find that while firms in non-competitive industries experience a significant stock price decline, firms in competitive industries experience a small and insignificant stock price impact. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：312 / 331

页数：20

共 42 条

[11] Takeover Defenses and Competition: The Role of Stakeholders [J].