Extended estimator approach for 2 X 2 games and its mapping to the Ising Hamiltonian

被引:6
作者
Ariosa, D [1 ]
Fort, H
机构
[1] Ecole Polytech Fed Lausanne, FSB, IPMC, Inst Phys Complex Matter, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
[2] Univ Republica, Fac Ciencias, Inst Fis, Montevideo 11400, Uruguay
关键词
D O I
10.1103/PhysRevE.71.016132
中图分类号
O35 [流体力学]; O53 [等离子体物理学];
学科分类号
070204 ; 080103 ; 080704 ;
摘要
We consider a system of adaptive self-interested agents interacting by playing an iterated pairwise prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. Each player has two options: either cooperate (C) or defect (D). Agents have no (long term) memory to reciprocate nor identifying tags to distinguish C from D. We show how their 16 possible elementary Markovian (one-step memory) strategies can be cast in a simple general formalism in terms of an estimator of expected utilities Delta*. This formalism is helpful to map a subset of these strategies into an Ising Hamiltonian in a straightforward way. This connection in turn serves to shed light on the evolution of the iterated games played by agents, which can represent a broad variety of individuals from firms of a market to species coexisting in an ecosystem. Additionally, this magnetic description may be useful to introduce noise in a natural and simple way. The equilibrium states reached by the system depend strongly on whether the dynamics are synchronous or asynchronous and also on the system connectivity.
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页数:8
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