A tale of two outsourcing contracts - An agency-theoretical perspective

被引：27

作者：

Aubert, BA

Patry, M

Rivard, S

机构：

[1] HEC Montreal, Montreal, PQ H3T 2A7, Canada

[2] CIRANO, Montreal, PQ H3A 2A5, Canada

来源：

WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK | 2003年 / 45卷 / 02期

关键词：

outsourcing; incentive contracts; agency theory;

D O I：

10.1007/BF03250897

中图分类号：

TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

This study analyzes two extreme outsourcing situations. In the first case, contractual problems derailed the original agreement and precipitated a disastrous divorce. In the second case, the strategic alliance between the firm and its suppliers was supported by governance mechanisms that paved the way to a successful and harmonious relationship. Agency theory provides a conceptual background for analyzing the cases. Lessons are drawn from the experiences of the firms studied, and recommendations are made for the design of outsourcing contracts that curb contractual opportunism.

引用

页码：181 / 190

页数：10

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