When are nonanonymous players negligible?

被引:30
作者
Fudenberg, D [1 ]
Levine, D
Pesendorfer, W
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Econ, Los Angeles, CA 90024 USA
[3] Princeton Univ, Dept Econ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jeth.1997.2373
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We examine games played by a single large player and a large number of opponents who are small, but not anonymous. if the Flay of the small players is observed with noise, and if the number of actions the large player controls is bounded as the number of small players grows, the equilibrium set converges to that of the grime where there is a continuum of small players. This paper extends previous work on the negligibility of small players by dropping the assumption that small players' actions are "anonymous." That is, we allow each small player's actions to be observed separately, instead of supposing that the small players' actions are only observed through their effect on an aggregate statistic. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:46 / 71
页数:26
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