Socioemotional Wealth and Corporate Responses to Institutional Pressures: Do Family-Controlled Firms Pollute Less?

被引：1138

作者：

Berrone, Pascual ^{[1
]}

Cruz, Cristina ^{[2
]}

Gomez-Mejia, Luis R. ^{[3
]}

Larraza-Kintana, Martin ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] IESE Business Sch, Madrid 28023, Spain

[2] IE Business Sch, Madrid 28006, Spain

[3] Texas A&M Univ, Mays Business Sch, College Stn, TX 77843 USA

[4] Univ Publ Navarra, Pamplona 31006, Navarra, Spain

来源：

ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY | 2010年 / 55卷 / 01期

关键词：

ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY ORIENTATION; RESOURCE-BASED VIEW; CEO PAY; ENVIRONMENTAL-MANAGEMENT; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; MANAGERIAL DISCRETION; IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; UNITED-STATES; PERFORMANCE;

D O I：

10.2189/asqu.2010.55.1.82

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper compares the environmental performance of family and nonfamily public corporations between 1998 and 2002, using a sample of 194 U.S. firms required to report their emissions. We found that family-controlled public firms protect their socioemotional wealth by having a better environmental performance than their nonfamily counterparts, particularly at the local level, and that for the nonfamily firms, stock ownership by the chief executive officer (CEO) has a negative environmental impact. We also found that the positive effect of family ownership on environmental performance persists independently of whether the CEO is a family member or serves both as CEO and board chair.(circle)

引用

页码：82 / 113

页数：32

共 159 条

[51] The determinants of executive compensation in family-controlled public corporations [J].