Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions

被引：74

作者：

Edelman, Benjamin ^{[1
]}

Schwarz, Michael ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Boston, MA 02163 USA

[2] Yahoo Labs, Berkeley, CA 94704 USA

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/aer.100.2.597

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：597 / 602

页数：6

共 14 条

[1] Abrams Z., 2008, Applied Economics Research Bulletin, Special Issue on Theoretical, Empirical, and Experimental Research on Auctions, P98
[2] ATHEY S, 2010, STRUCTURAL MOD UNPUB
[3] Athey S., 2009, 15253 NAT BUR EC RES
[4] BORGERS T, 2007, EQUILIBRIUM BI UNPUB
[5] CARY M, 2007, P 8 ACM C EL COMM EC, P262
[6] Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords
Edelman, Benjamin
Ostrovsky, Michael
Schwarz, Michael
[J]. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2007, 97 (01) : 242 - 259
[7] IYENGAR G, 2006, 200604 COMP OPT RES
[8] Krishna V., 2002, Auction Theory
[9] OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN
MYERSON, RB
[J]. MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 1981, 6 (01) : 58 - 73
[10] Ostrovslcy M., 2010, RESERVE PRICES UNPUB