Demand reduction in multiunit auctions: Evidence from a sportscard field experiment

被引：117

作者：

List, JA ^{[1
]}

Lucking-Reiley, D

机构：

[1] Univ Cent Florida, Dept Econ, Orlando, FL 32765 USA

[2] Vanderbilt Univ, Dept Econ, Nashville, TN 37235 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2000年 / 90卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/aer.90.4.961

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：961 / 972

页数：12

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