Evolutionary dynamics on graphs

被引:936
作者
Lieberman, E [1 ]
Hauert, C
Nowak, MA
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Dept Organism & Evolutionary Biol, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Harvard Univ, Dept Math, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Harvard Univ, Dept Appl Math, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[4] MIT, Harvard MIT Div Hlth Sci & Technol, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
[5] Univ British Columbia, Dept Zool, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada
基金
美国安德鲁·梅隆基金会; 美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1038/nature03204
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Evolutionary dynamics have been traditionally studied in the context of homogeneous or spatially extended populations(1-4). Here we generalize population structure by arranging individuals on a graph. Each vertex represents an individual. The weighted edges denote reproductive rates which govern how often individuals place offspring into adjacent vertices. The homogeneous population, described by the Moran process(3), is the special case of a fully connected graph with evenly weighted edges. Spatial structures are described by graphs where vertices are connected with their nearest neighbours. We also explore evolution on random and scale-free networks(5-7). We determine the fixation probability of mutants, and characterize those graphs for which fixation behaviour is identical to that of a homogeneous population(7). Furthermore, some graphs act as suppressors and others as amplifiers of selection. It is even possible to find graphs that guarantee the fixation of any advantageous mutant. We also study frequency-dependent selection and show that the outcome of evolutionary games can depend entirely on the structure of the underlying graph. Evolutionary graph theory has many fascinating applications ranging from ecology to multi-cellular organization and economics.
引用
收藏
页码:312 / 316
页数:5
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