A resolution of N-person prisoner's dilemma

被引:20
作者
Nishihara, K
机构
[1] Faculty of Economics, Fukuoka University, Fukuoka 814-80, 8-19-1, Nanakuma, Jonan-ku
关键词
JEL Classification Numbers: C72; D62.;
D O I
10.1007/s001990050172
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The purpose of this paper is to show that cooperation is possible in N-person prisoners' dilemma if players have incomplete information on the order of their moves. We consider a modified version of N-person prisoners' dilemma in which players sequentially move in the order determined by Nature, and during the play they get some information about others. We provide an information partition and a condition of payoffs for which cooperation is attained in an equilibrium. Further, for the case that full cooperation is not attained, we examine the largest partial cooperation which is achieved in an equilibrium.
引用
收藏
页码:531 / 540
页数:10
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