How does law affect finance? An examination of equity tunneling in Bulgaria

被引:76
作者
Atanasov, Vladimir [1 ]
Black, Bernard [2 ]
Ciccotello, Conrad [3 ]
Gyoshev, Stanley [4 ]
机构
[1] Coll William & Mary, Mason Sch Business, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA
[2] Univ Texas Austin, Austin, TX 78712 USA
[3] Georgia State Univ, Atlanta, GA 30302 USA
[4] Univ Exeter, Exeter EX4 4PT, Devon, England
关键词
Equity tunneling; Preemptive rights; Dilution; Freezeout; Controlling shareholder; Securities law; Emerging markets; INVESTOR PROTECTION; MASS PRIVATIZATION; LEGAL; PRIVATE; SHAREHOLDERS; OWNERSHIP;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2009.12.005
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We model and test the mechanisms through which law affects tunneling and tunneling affects firm valuation. In 2002, Bulgaria adopted legal changes which limit equity tunneling through dilutive equity offerings and freezeouts. Following the changes, minority shareholders participate equally in equity offerings, where before they Suffered severe dilution; freezeout offer price ratios quadruple; and Tobin's q rises sharply for firms at high risk of tunneling. The paper shows the importance of legal rules in limiting equity tunneling, the role of equity tunneling risk as a factor in determining equity prices, and substitution by controlling shareholders between different forms of tunneling. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:155 / 173
页数:19
相关论文
共 47 条
  • [11] The world price of insider trading
    Bhattacharya, U
    Daouk, H
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2002, 57 (01) : 75 - 108
  • [12] Russian privatization and corporate governance: What went wrong?
    Black, B
    Kraakman, R
    Tarassova, A
    [J]. STANFORD LAW REVIEW, 2000, 52 (06) : 1731 - 1808
  • [13] Black Bernard., 2001, EMERG MARK REV, V2, P89, DOI DOI 10.1016/S1566-0141(01)00012-7
  • [14] Black BS, 2001, UCLA LAW REV, V48, P781
  • [15] Why higher takeover premia protect minority shareholders
    Burkart, M
    Gromb, D
    Panunzi, F
    [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1998, 106 (01) : 172 - 204
  • [16] THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST
    COASE, RH
    [J]. JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1960, 3 (OCT) : 1 - 44
  • [17] Dual-class premium, corporate governance, and the mandatory bid rule: Evidence from the Brazilian stock market
    da Silva, Andre Carvalhal
    Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar
    [J]. JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2007, 13 (01) : 1 - 24
  • [18] GOING PRIVATE - MINORITY FREEZEOUTS AND STOCKHOLDER WEALTH
    DEANGELO, H
    DEANGELO, L
    RICE, EM
    [J]. JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1984, 27 (02) : 367 - 401
  • [19] The law and economics of self-dealing
    Djankov, Simeon
    La Porta, Rafael
    Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio
    Shleifer, Andrei
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2008, 88 (03) : 430 - 465
  • [20] Why do countries matter so much for corporate governance?
    Doidge, Craig
    Karolyi, G. Andrew
    Stulz, Ren M.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2007, 86 (01) : 1 - 39