How does firm size affect technology licensing? Empirical evidence from China

被引:13
作者
Li, Ming [1 ]
Chen, Xiangdong [1 ]
Zhang, Gupeng [2 ]
机构
[1] Beihang Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100191, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Sch Publ Policy & Management, Beijing 100049, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Patent; Technology licensing; Firm size; Export-oriented firms; State-owned Firms; Licensing propensity; Technology competition; PATENTS; MARKET; EXPLORATION; INNOVATION; JAPANESE; STRATEGY;
D O I
10.1007/s11192-017-2451-6
中图分类号
TP39 [计算机的应用];
学科分类号
081203 ; 0835 ;
摘要
Technology licensing is viewed as the key factor for activating the sleeping patents. This study re-examines the relationship between the firm size and its technology licensing activity. The empirical results show that there is a U-shaped relationship between the firm size and technology licensing. However, this U-shaped relationship appears only in the markets with high competition, which confirms a moderate role of the technology competition in the relationship between the firm size and technology licensing. Chinese firms lag behind developed countries in terms of the licensing strategies. e.g., Chinese firms have fewer patents that are cross licensed. China's export-oriented firms show relatively more positive licensing propensity, where large, small and medium sized firms do not show essentially different willingness to license out their patents compared with non export-oriented firms. China's state owned firms are less likely to license out their patents compared with that of private firms. Policy implications are presented at the end of this study.
引用
收藏
页码:1249 / 1269
页数:21
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