The task-specific nature of domain-general reasoning

被引:76
作者
Thompson, VA [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK S7N 5A5, Canada
基金
加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;
关键词
conditional reasoning; deduction; interpretation; mental models;
D O I
10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00082-2
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
This paper develops a theory of how interpretative processes constrain inferential performance on conditional reasoning tasks. Experiment 1 investigated the hypothesis that performance on common reasoning tasks is mediated by different interpretive variables. Necessity and sufficiency relations predicted performance on the conditional arguments task, whereas on the Wason task, performance was predicted by whether the conditional statement instantiated a deontic or a factual relation. Performance on the truth-table task was predicted by both sets of variables. Experiment 2 explored the mapping relation between interpretation, representation, and inference. It was observed that conditional responses to the Wason and arguments tasks were based on different representations of the conditional relationship. These data rule out a simple model of the interplay between interpretation and reasoning in which the interpretation of a statement is driven solely by its content, and instead, indicate that the interpretation of conditional relations is task-specific. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:209 / 268
页数:60
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