CEO pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect

被引：73

作者：

Hayes, Rachel M. ^{[1
]}

Schaefer, Scott ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Utah, David Eccles Sch Business, Salt Lake City, UT 84112 USA

[2] Univ Utah, Inst Publ & Int Affairs, Salt Lake City, UT 84112 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2009年 / 94卷 / 02期

关键词：

CEO pay; Asymmetric information; Signaling; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; INVESTMENT; FIRMS; RENEGOTIATION; COMPENSATION; CONTRACTS; INVESTORS; BEHAVIOR;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.12.006

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

The "Lake Wobegon Effect,'' which is widely cited as a potential cause for rising CEO pay, is said to occur because no firm wants to admit to having a CEO who is below average, and so no firm allows its CEO's pay package to lag market expectations. We develop a game-theoretic model of this Effect. In our model, a CEO's wage may serve as a signal of match surplus, and therefore affect the value of the firm. We compare equilibria of our model to a full-information case and derive conditions under which equilibrium wages are distorted upward. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：280 / 290

页数：11

共 29 条

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