Sovereign debt as intertemporal barter

被引：110

作者：

Kletzer, KM ^{[1
]}

Wright, BD

机构：

[1] Univ Calif Santa Cruz, Dept Econ, Santa Cruz, CA 95064 USA

[2] Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Agr & Resource Econ, Gainnini Fdn, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2000年 / 90卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/aer.90.3.621

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：621 / 639

页数：19

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