Can Pay Regulation Kill? Panel Data Evidence on the Effect of Labor Markets on Hospital Performance

被引：68

作者：

Propper, Carol ^{[1
]}

Van Reenen, John ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ London Imperial Coll Sci Technol & Med, Ctr Market & Publ Org, Univ Bristol, London SW7 2AZ, England

[2] Ctr Econ Performance, London Business Sch, London, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 2010年 / 118卷 / 02期

关键词：

COMPETITION; NHS; QUALITY; CARE; CONSEQUENCES; TECHNOLOGY; EMPLOYMENT; LAYOFFS; IMPROVE; GROWTH;

D O I：

10.1086/653137

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In many sectors, pay is regulated to be equal across heterogeneous geographical labor markets. When the competitive outside wage is higher than the regulated wage, there are likely to be falls in quality. We exploit panel data from the population of English hospitals in which regulated pay for nurses is essentially flat across the country. Higher outside wages significantly worsen hospital quality as measured by hospital deaths for emergency heart attacks. A 10 percent increase in the outside wage is associated with a 7 percent increase in death rates. Furthermore, the regulation increases aggregate death rates in the public health care system.

引用

页码：222 / 273

页数：52