Can media deter management from manipulating earnings? Evidence from China

被引：51

作者：

Qi B. ^{[1
]}

Yang R. ^{[2
]}

Tian G. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] School of Management, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an

[2] E. Philip Saunders College of Business, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, NY

来源：

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting | 2014年 / 42卷 / 3期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Corporate governance; Earnings management; Media exposure;

D O I：

10.1007/s11156-013-0353-0

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

This study examines the influence of media exposure on managers' earnings management behavior using China's publicly traded firms during 2001-2009. We find that firms with more media exposure (both negative and non-negative) manage their earnings less than firms with less media exposure. We also find that "suspect firms" (being specially treated or with refinancing plans like seasoned equity offerings or right offerings) with more media exposure engage in more accrual-based earnings management relative to other firms. These results suggest that Chinese media serve as an external monitor to the majority of firms and place excessive pressure on suspect firms. This paper contributes incrementally to the literature by emphasizing the conflicting role media exposure plays in managerial decisions in earnings management. The findings of this study have practical implications for regulators, auditors, financial analysts, as well as other information intermediaries. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media New York.

引用

页码：571 / 597

页数：26

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