From schumpeterian democracy to constitutional democracy

被引：1

作者：

Pereira P.T. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Instituto Superior de Economia E Gestão, Universidade Técnica de Lisboa, 1200, Lisboa

来源：

Constitutional Political Economy | 2000年 / 11卷 / 1期

关键词：

Barriers to entry; Democracy; Equal political participation; Schumpeter;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1009022117416

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

A critical issue of a constitutional democracy is to determine an optimal limitation of citizens' political liberties. This problem is analysed here within the framework of a parliamentary system of government, and in the context of Rawls' principle of equal political participation. It is argued that optimal barriers to entry into political competition are a function of the legislative decision rules, the domain of collective choices, and the rules for selecting (and dismissing) the executive. Contrary to Schumpeter and Riker who rejected 'populism' (the approach that public policy should be a result of citizens' preferences), we argue that it is possible to reconcile greater citizen participation and liberal democracy with an appropriate institutional design. © 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers,.

引用

页码：69 / 86

页数：17

共 70 条

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