Optimal patent length and height

被引:1
作者
Beschorner P.F.E. [1 ]
机构
[1] Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)
关键词
Innovation; Patent height; Patent length; Patent policy;
D O I
10.1007/s10663-007-9059-7
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Patent breadth and length have been discussed extensively in innovation literature. In this article, I analyze the optimal degree of novelty of patent protection and its tradeoff with patent length. In the context of subsequent innovations each innovation builds on the previous one. The degree of novelty necessary for a non-infringing patent is crucial for the firms' incentive to innovate. One of the findings is that a monopolist's optimal degree of novelty is lesser than would be socially desirable. Furthermore, there exists a finite optimal patent length. Competitors introducing an improved technology cause uncertainty which may be compensated by extending patent length. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2008.
引用
收藏
页码:233 / 240
页数:7
相关论文
共 15 条
[11]  
Scotchmer S., Innovation and Incentives, (2005)
[12]  
Shaked A., Sutton J., Natural oligopolies, Econometrica, 51, 5, pp. 1469-1483, (1983)
[13]  
Takalo T., Innovation and imitation under imperfect patent protection, J Econ, 67, 3, pp. 229-241, (1998)
[14]  
Tirole J., The Theory of Industrial Organization, (1992)
[15]  
van Dijk T.W., Patent height and competition in product improvements, J Industr Econ, 44, pp. 151-167, (1996)