The accrual effect on future earnings

被引:11
作者
Chan K. [1 ]
Jegadeesh N. [2 ]
Sougiannis T. [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Department of Finance, College of Management, National Taiwan University, Taipei, 10660, 50, Lane 144, Sect. 4, Keelung Road
[2] Goizueta Business School, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322-2722
[3] Department of Accountancy, College of Business, Univ. of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL 61820
[4] Athens Lab. of Bus. Admin. (ALBA), Vouliagmeni 16671, Athens
关键词
Accrual reversal; Cash flow Jones model; Earnings management; Earnings prediction;
D O I
10.1023/B:REQU.0000015852.00973.8f
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Earnings manipulation has become a widespread practice for US corporations. However, most studies in the literature focus on whether certain incentives would facilitate managers to manipulate earnings and there has been little evidence documenting the consequences of earnings manipulation. This paper fills this gap by examining how current accruals affect future earnings (the accrual effect) and measuring the size of this effect. We find that the aggregate future earnings will decrease by $0.046 and $0.096, respectively, in the next one and three years for a $1 increase of current accruals. Over the very long-term (25 years), 20% of current accruals will reverse. This negative accrual effect is more significant for firms with high price-earnings ratios, high market-to-book ratios and high accruals where earnings management is more likely to occur. We show that incorporating the accrual effect is useful in improving the accuracy of earnings forecasts for these firms. Accordingly, the empirical results are consistent with the notion that earnings management causes the negative relationship between current accruals and future earnings. In addition, this paper shows that one recently developed accrual model has better performance than the popularly cited model in identifying manipulated earnings.
引用
收藏
页码:97 / 121
页数:24
相关论文
共 27 条
[11]  
Dechow P.M., Sloan R.G., Sweeney A.P., Detecting earnings management, Accounting Review, 70, pp. 193-225, (1995)
[12]  
Dechow P.M., Sloan R.G., Sweeney A.P., Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC, Contemporary Accounting Research, 13, pp. 1-36, (1996)
[13]  
Defond M.L., Jiambalvo J., Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17, pp. 145-176, (1994)
[14]  
Erickson M., Wang S., Earnings management by acquiring firms in stock for stock mergers, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 27, pp. 149-176, (1999)
[15]  
Fama E.F., French K.R., Industry cost of equity, Journal of Financial Economics, 43, pp. 153-193, (1997)
[16]  
Guay W.R., Kothari S.P., Watts R.L., A market-based evaluation of discretionary accrual models, Journal of Accounting Research (Suppl.), 34, pp. 83-105, (1996)
[17]  
Healy P., Discussion of a market-based evaluation of discretionary accrual models, Journal of Accounting Research (Suppl), 34, pp. 107-115, (1996)
[18]  
Hribar P., Collins D.W., Errors in estimating accruals: Implications for empirical research, Journal of Accounting Research, 40, pp. 105-134, (2002)
[19]  
Jones J.J., Earnings management during import relief investigations, Journal of Accounting Research, 29, pp. 193-228, (1991)
[20]  
Kasznik R., On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management, Journal of Accounting Research, 37, pp. 57-81, (1999)