ADVERSE SELECTION, REPEATED INSURANCE CONTRACTS AND ANNOUNCEMENT STRATEGY

被引:33
作者
DIONNE, G
LASSERRE, P
机构
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D O I
10.2307/2297743
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
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页码:719 / 723
页数:5
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