MONITORING COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS IN A REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP

被引：163

作者：

RADNER, R

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1912747

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：1127 / 1148

页数：22

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