MONITORING COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS IN A REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP

被引:163
作者
RADNER, R
机构
关键词
D O I
10.2307/1912747
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
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页码:1127 / 1148
页数:22
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